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COMMENTARY
NONIDEOLOGICAL JUDICIAL REFORM AND ITS
LIMITS-THE REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE
GEORGE D. BROW4N*
I. INTRODUCTION-IDEOLOGICAL AND NoNIDEOLOGIcAL APPROACHES TO
JUDICIAL REFORM
In April of this year the Federal Courts Study Committee issued its
final Report containing over one hundred proposals for change.' According
to the accompanying press release, "[t]he study generating those proposals
reflects the most comprehensive examination of the federal court system
ever undertaken. ' 2 It is certainly true that the Committee's members are
exceptionally well qualified to perform this task.3 Their own expertise was
supplemented by staff work, input from public hearings, 4 and extensive
research from a battery of consultants and advisors. 5 The Report is an
important document. Many of the recommendations-such as the virtual
abolition of diversity jurisdiction6 and the reallocation of most drug cases
from federal to state courts7-- would surely have an impact on the operation
of the federal courts. Yet for all that, something is missing, at least to the
academic reader. The Report is largely silent on what law school courses
treat as the major issues of federal jurisdiction.
Particularly striking is the almost total lack of discussion of the myriad
of Supreme Court decisions in the area and of the doctrines they develop.'
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1961, Harvard; LL.B. 1965,
Harvard Law School.
1. REPORT OF THE FmERAL CousrTs STUDy COmMTTEE (1990). Available from the
Federal Courts Study Committee, 22716 United States Courthouse, Independence Mall West,
601 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106-1722 [hereinafter REPoRT].
2. Federal Courts Study Committee, News Release, April 2, 1990 ("Unprecedented
Study of Federal Courts Released Today").
3. The Committee's fifteen members include five federal judges, one state judge,
members of Congress, practitioners, and a former Solicitor General of the United States.
4. See REPoRT, supra note I, at 32-33 (describing hearings and other sources of public
input).
5. Id. at 199-201 (listing advisors and consultants).
6. Id. at 38-42.
7. Id. at 35-38.
8. The major exception is the recommendation that the rules concerning pendent parties
be changed. See id. at 47-48. This would involve overruling Finley v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 2003 (1989).
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Over the last twenty years (the period of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts)
the Court has handed down. an extraordinary number of rulings across the
range of federal jurisdiction. 9 To a considerable extent these cases are the
law of federal jurisdiction, at least in those areas where there is controversy
over its reach. Statutes and statutory interpretation play a secondary role.10
A salient feature of these cases is the sharply ideological tone of the
opinions produced by a deeply divided Court. Ostensibly technical ques-
tions-for example, the availability of pendent jurisdiction in federal court
suits against state officials'-become battlegrounds for contrasting visions
of the role of the federal judiciary and the very structure of American
government.' 2 Perhaps the Committee's apparent choice to steer away from
so much of federal courts doctrine represents a more basic decision to
engage in an exercise of nonideological, as opposed to ideological, judicial
reform.
An ideological approach to federal judicial reform emphasizes basic
systemic value issues such as balancing the need to vindicate national
authority against claims of some form of state sovereignty and the con-
stralnts which separation of powers doctrines impose on the courts. It would
produce proposals for change, or consolidation, in the role of the federal
courts in such controverted areas as abstention, implied rights of action,
and habeas corpus. Nonideological reform, by contrast, focuses on opera-
tional issues in the federal court system such as the existence of a caseload
backlog, the proper role of the judge in managing cases, and the availability
of alternatives to classic article III adjudication.
I do not contend that the line between the two approaches is always
crystal clear. Those who want to see a diminution of federal authority vis-
A-vis the states may invoke caseload concerns to reduce the role of the
federal courts. Conversely, any proposal to lighten the federal courts' role
by shifting a category of cases to the state courts may rest on a view of
what cases have a higher claim to be in the federal judicial system. The
Committee's proposal to eliminate most of the diversity jurisdiction is an
example of how the two approaches can seem to mingle. It is certainly a
means of reducing the federal courts' caseload, 3 thus making the system
9. For a critical discussion of the entire range of Burger-Rehnquist Court jurisdictional
doctrines, see Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation
of Jurisdiction, 64 NonRE DAmE L. RFv. 321 (1989).
10. Congress, of course, possesses the power to establish the lower federal courts and
prescribe their jurisdiction. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; art. III, § 1. In applying the basic
jurisdictional statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 the Court often purports to be engaging in
statutory construction, but the broad scope of the jurisdictional statutes permits a substantial
amount of judicial discretion on questions of jurisdictional policy. The Court has admitted
that its "construction" may run counter to Congress' intent. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 n.8 (1983).
11. See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
12. See Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. Ray. 1141, 1164-1223
(1988).
13. For example, using 1988 statistics, the Committee estimates that abolishing diversity
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work more quickly and efficiently for those who are in it. At the same time
it can be viewed as doubly ideological in that it reduces a form of federal
intrusion on state sovereignty (deciding state law cases 4) and furthers the
goal of a role for the federal courts that emphasizes the value of national
supremacy. 5 Still, diversity does not present any of the difficult ideological
questions which have triggered most of the Court's major federalism juris-
dictional decisions: when and to what extent should the federal courts act
to supervise state governmental actions, especially when state judicial relief
is available, and when and to what extent should federal courts act to
review the manner in which state courts have enforced federal rights,
especially against state officials? A brief examination of these cases, as well
as cases and issues involving separation of powers, will give a better sense
of the issues with which the Committee might have dealt.
II. FEDERAL CouRTs DocTmmRa AND TH COMMITTEE REPORT-A MIssnIG
INGREDIENT?
The current corpus of federal courts doctrines is based substantially on
decisions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The major thrust of these
cases is to restrict access to the federal courts. The Court is actively managing
the judicial system; 16 it can even be viewed as engaging in its own brand
of judicial reform.'7 This endeavor may be motivated in part by concerns
for the federal courts' caseload,18 and in part by a theory of adjudication
which limits any litigant's "bites at the apple."' 9 Underlying these concerns,
however, are more fundamental notions of federalism and separation of
powers. The result is not just doctrine in some abstract sense of the word.
The doctrines determine who can get into federal court and who cannot.
A good example is the Court's jurisdictional federalism cases. Many
persons claim the protection of federal rights against their state governments.
Although the eleventh amendment does not even seem to deal with federal
question suits against a state in federal court by one of its own citizens,
the Court has utilized the amendment to erect a formidable set of barriers
in the way of such litigants.2 Damage suits are prohibited where the state
jurisdiction would reduce the courts of appeals' caseload by almost ten percent. REPORT, supra
note 1, at 39, 41.
14. Id. at 14.
15. See id. at 15.
16. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
17. See Levit, supra note 9, at 321-22.
18. Id. at 322, 326-27.
19. For example, this theory may manifest itself in cases applying the concept of res
judicata strictly, and in cases restricting the availability of habeas corpus as a means of
relitigating issues already decided in state trials.
20. See generally Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh
Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 Gao. L.J. 363, 366-67 (1985).
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is the real party in interest, 2' although equitable relief may be available. 22
The recent cases also deal with eleventh amendment limits on declaratory
reliefP and pendent jurisdiction.
24
The Report contains no recommendations concerning these crucial issues
and appears not to discuss the eleventh amendment at all. One might justify
this omission on the ground that the eleventh amendment's bars on federal
jurisdiction are a constitutional issue and that addressing constitutional rules
was beyond the Committee's mandate. 25 A striking aspect of the eleventh
amendment cases, however, is the large role which they assign to Congress
in permitting citizens to sue their states in federal court.26 The Committee
might have considered whether Congress should pass some form of statute
authorizing these suits. 27 The Committee might also have addressed how
Congress should respond to the Court's rules of statutory construction for
eleventh amendment issues. 2
Litigants with federal grievances against state (and local)29 governments
are liable to run into Younger abstention. This doctrine applies if the litigant
is a party to pending state proceedings which raise th6 federal issue and in
which there is an important state interest, usually manifested through the
presence of the state, or an official, as a party.30 Younger is only one of
several abstention doctrines, but it is probably the most significant in terms
of its impact on litigants, 3' and is the form of abstention that is most clearly
a creature of the Burger-Rehnquist Court. Congressional power to act here
is even clearer than in the eleventh amendment area. The abstention cases
represent a form of judge-made federal common law. The Report's treatment
of the issue is as follows: "[wie recommend for further study, but take no
21. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974).
22. Id. at 670-71.
23. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 46 (1985).
24. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
25. The authorizing statute directs the Committee, among other duties, to "recommend
revisions to be made to laws of the United States as the Committee ... deems advisable."
REPORT, supra note 1, at 191, citing Federal Courts Study Act § 105(2), Pub. L. No. 100-
702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). There is no comparable specific charge concerning constitutional
issues, although the Committee is to "make such other recommendations and conclusions it
deems advisable." Id.
26. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (holding Congress may
authorize suits against states in federal court to enforce legislation enacted under the commerce
power).
27. See Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment,
and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court,
71 VA. L. REv. 343, 394-401 (1985) (discussing alternative approaches).
28. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2403 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing and criticizing strictness of Court's rules).
29. The eleventh amendment is not applicable to suits against local governments and
their officials. The Younger cases, however, do not seem to apply any distinction based on
whether the official works for a state or local government. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (applying Younger doctrine to federal action against county officials).
30. See generally C. WmOsnT, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRmTS 320-30 (4th ed. 1983).
31. Levit, supra note 9, at 336.
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position on, proposals concerning the Anti-Injunction Act, abstention, and
removal .. -"1 The Report notes that "[tlhoughtful proposals" on absten-
tion can be found in Part III of the Report. 33 The status of Part III is
something of a mystery, however. It consists of several thousand pages of
studies, research, correspondence, etc. It was released some months after
the full Report with cautionary notices that "[iln no event should the
enclosed materials be construed as having been adopted by the Commit-
tee." ' 34 Part III does indeed contain an excellent discussion of Younger and
other forms of abstention. The analysis includes a proposal that Younger
be retained, but curtailed so as not to preclude damage suits. 35 The Com-
mittee did not adopt this proposal, however, and placing it in Part III may
be the equivalent of placing it in limbo.
Federalism concerns have also played an important role in the current
Court's decisions on federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. As with the
eleventh amendment and Younger abstention, habeas corpus cases present
the question of the proper role of the federal courts in supervising state
governmental processes. In this instance the processes are those of the state
courts themselves. Not surprisingly, the current Court has shown great
reluctance to do this and has cut back on the availability and scope of
habeas corpus relief.36 The Committee opted once again not to join the
debate. The Report states that the matter is "of central concern to the
nation and its courts,"137 and notes that federal habeas corpus cases have
grown substantially in volume. However, the Committee chose to make no
recommendation on the ground that Congress was considering revisions of
habeas corpus procedures in death penalty cases and that proposals on other
aspects of the issue "are in various stages of development. ' 38 Again, the
reader is referred to Part III, 39 which contains an excellent analysis of the
matter 0
32. REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
33. Id.
34. FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY CommrEE, WORKNO PAERS AND SuBCOMMTTEE REPORTS
(July 1, 1990) [hereinafter Wox1o PAPERS]. The disclaimer is contained on the first page of
each of the two volumes of Part III. The Report of the Subcommittee on Administration,
Management and Structure contains an additional disclaimer that "[t]he working papers herein
are not a part of the recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee. They may,
in some cases be contrary to the final determinations of the Committee. They are reproduced
solely as background material." Id.
35. FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY COMmTEE, REPORT OF THE SUBCOsaTT=E ON THE ROLE OF
THE FEDERAL CoURTs AND THnm RELATION TO TIM STATES, Part III, Volume 1, at 602-44
[hereinafter STATES Stmcommrr= REPORT]. Fortunately for those interested in the subject,
the excellent background papers from this Subcommittee Report are reprinted in Federal Courts
Symposium, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1.
36. E.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (limiting federal habeas corpus review
in cases which rest on an independent and adequate state ground).
37. REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. STATES SuBcomr-rEE REPORT, supra note 35, Part III, Volume 1, at 468-515.
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Interestingly enough, the Committee's Draft Report did address habeas
corpus, although not in great detail. The decision to avoid it in the final
version may reflect a general desire to stay out of controversial issues, at
least where the Court has generated the controversy. But the jurisdictional
federalism cases are not just controversial. They are "of central concern to
the nation and its courts." The would-be federal plaintiffs or petitioners in
such cases are strong candidates for a federal forum. This is particularly
so if one applies the Committee's apparent philosophy of favoring federal
adjudication for "the protection of individual liberty against actions of the
political branches of government. ' 41 The Court feels that in these cases
considerations of comity and federalism are of an even higher order, while
strong dissents emphasize the role of the federal courts in protecting federal
rights. 42 This sounds like the Committee's approach, but one cannot know.
Separate from the merits of the federalism decisions is the related
question of whether the Court has the authority to fashion such doctrines.
In the abstention context, a powerful argument has been advanced that the
Court in so doing is thwarting choices Congress has already made in basic
jurisdictional and remedial statutes.43 The argument may have implications
beyond abstention. 44 If the Court's development of jurisdictional rules is in
fact a problem, apart from the content of those rules, the Federal Courts
Study Committee would seem an ideal vehicle to put the matter before
Congress so that it can respond. There are those, including this author,
who insist that the Court's abstention decisions do not represent a misuse
of authority. 4 Under this view, the development of federal court jurisdiction
is an ongoing process in which Congress and the Court engage in a periodic
dialogue.46 But if one takes this view, an occasion like the Report seems an
ideal vehicle to inform Congress of what its partner in the dialogue has
been doing and what the effects of these developments are on the federal
courts. This would be the case even if the Committee had reviewed and
reached agreement on all of the decisions that Congress might address.
I have dealt with the federalism jurisdictional cases at some length
because they present the issue of ideological judicial reform in sharp focus.
Doctrines promulgated by the Supreme Court keep cases out of the federal
courts based on conclusions about the bearing of federalism values on
federal jurisdiction. Congress has power in the area and might want to
41. REPoRT, supra note 1, at 8.
42. E.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 342 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Huffman
v, Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,
94 YALE L. J, 71 (1984),
44. The Court's habeas corpus decisions may present questions of whether it has gone
beyond the bounds of the authorizing statute. See M. REDISH, FEDMAL COURTS 943 (2d ed.
19s9).
45. See Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide-Rethinking Younger
Abstention, forthcoming in George Washington Law Review.
46. See, e.g., Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 577 (1985).
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reform jurisdiction in a more inclusive direction. Let us consider briefly a
group of recent cases in which jurisdiction is restricted in the name of
another basic value: separation of powers.
The best known cases in the group are those in which the Court has
refused to "imply" a private right to sue in federal court from a statute
whose remedial scheme does not contain the judicial remedy which the
plaintiff seeks.47 The clear tendency of the cases is against implication,4
but some go in the other direction. 49 The Court's doctrinal approach is far
from clear, reflecting a continuing division over whether it is ever proper
to infer a private right from a statute not containing one. 50 The matter is
of intense importance to the federal claimant because, unlike in the feder-
alism cases, the claimant's ability to get the alternative of state judicial
enforcement of the federal right is not free from doubt." The extent of
implied rights of action also affects the federal courts' caseload.
In 1979 then-Justice Rehnquist announced that "the ball is now in
Congress' court." 5 2 The Committee apparently agrees. The Report recom-
mends creation of an Office of Judicial Impact Assessment which would
advise on matters such as "the effect of proposed legislation on the judicial
branch." 53 The assessment would include "spotlighting drafting defects that
might breed unnecessary litigation, such as ... uncertainty as to whether
a private right of action was intended."154 As a supplement the Report
recommends that Congress "consider a 'checklist' for legislative staff to use
in reviewing proposed legislation for technical problems." 55 Items to be
reviewed include "whether a private cause of action is contemplated.
56
Adopting these recommendations would have a major impact: the virtual
end of the implied right doctrine. Until now the doctrine has shown
remarkable resiliency in the face of repeated assaults by conservative jus-
tices.5 7 The Report may represent a tacit acceptance of the conservative
47. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
48. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
49. E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
50. For example, in his influential dissent in Cannon, Justice Powell argued for virtual
elimination of the implied private right doctrine. Id. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. The Court's decision in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804 (1986), leaves the issue open. However, as the dissenters in that case pointed out, a
conclusion that Congress did not provide a private right of action might be viewed as preemption
of state enforcement of the federal right.
52. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring).
53. REPoRT, supra note 1, at 89. There is some ambiguity on whether the Office would
advise Congress directly or indirectly through the Judicial Conference. Id.
54. Id. at 90.
55. Id. at 91.
56. Id.
57. For example, in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988), Justice Marshall for
the Court refused to reduce the implied right doctrine to a "virtual dead letter." Id. at 179.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, advocated "the categorical position that federal private
rights of action will not be implied." Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1990]
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position, but it is somewhat surprising that the Committee chose to resolve
a major controverted issue of federal jurisdiction without discussing it.
As long as the Committee was going to deal with rights of action
implied from federal statutes, what about the issue of implying damages
remedies from the Constitution? Under the so called Bivens doctrine58 the
Court has asserted the judiciary's power to grant such remedies against
federal officials even though no statute authorizes them. 9 In recent years,
however, the trend has been to deny judicial damages relief against the
federal official if Congress has addressed the underlying subject matter and
provided some form of relief.60 The cases seem to treat the issue as one
primarily of statutory construction. 6' As long as this approach is taken,
would it not make sense to follow the Report's implied right approach and
develop a means of informing Congress of the problem when it is considering
statutes that might be read to preclude Bivens remedies even though the
latter problem does not arise as frequently?
There is one final group of cases in which the Court has fashioned
important doctrines and which the Committee Report addresses only par-
tially: those applying the basic jurisdictional statutes and establishing the
contours of what lawsuits and what configurations of parties can be brought
in the federal district courts. The Court has long played an important role
in this area. The best known example is the extensive judicial gloss on the
statute conferring jurisdiction over cases "arising under" the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States.6 2 The Court's approach has wavered,
but frequently has been restrictive. 63 The Court has applied the "well-
pleaded complaint rule" with a vengeance. 64 It has also held that a case did
not arise under federal law, even though the state complaint was based on
the standard of conduct in a federal statute, because that statute did not
provide for a private right of action.6 It is obvious that the well-pleaded
complaint rule gets in the way of a lot of cases that most people would
feel ought to be in federal court. A thoughtful section of Part III addresses
these issues tangentially in the context of removal and proposes modifica-
58. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
59. See generally Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs-Have the
Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263 (1989).
60. E.g., Schweicker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
61. See id. at 420-24.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
63. The tension is between the relatively strict "Holmes test"-that a case arises under
the law that creates the cause of action-and the more inclusive test of Smith v. Kansas City
Title and Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS
90-98 (4th ed. 1983). The decision in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S. 804 (1986), seems a victory for a restrictive approach.
64. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1983).
65. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 804.
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tions in current doctrine. 6 The Report itself does not deal with any of
them.
The Report does, however, speak out with some firmness in a closely
related area where the Court has also taken a restrictive approach: jurisdic-
tion over "pendent parties." 67 The concept of pendent claim jurisdiction is
well accepted. A federal court with jurisdiction over one of the plaintiff's
claims against the defendant may resolve other claims, not normally within
its power, if the claims arise out of a "common nucleus of operative fact."1
6
The situation is more complicated if resolution of the underlying controversy
would seem to require the addition of parties over whom the court would
not normally have jurisdiction. Recently, in Finley v. United States6 9 the
Supreme Court cast doubt on the validity of any pendent party jurisdiction,
at least where it is the plaintiff who seeks to use the device.
The Report calls on Congress to confirm the validity of pendent party
jurisdiction. 70 The background papers in Part III make it clear that this
would involve overruling Finley.7 1 The Report emphasizes the unfairness to
the plaintiff of not allowing him to bring in the party against whom he has
a closely related claim, but over whom the federal court has no jurisdiction.
He must either bring two suits, abandon one claim, or bring the entire case
in state court, and then only if it has jurisdiction over the federal claim.
7 2
This range of choices is undesirable, including the third which amounts to
"delegating the determination of federal issues to the state courts." 73
There is an important policy debate here. The Court's decisions do
seem grudging, but they are motivated by a desire to preserve the limited
nature of federal jurisdiction and a concern for the interests of "pendented"
defendants who could not otherwise be brought into federal court on this
matter by this plaintiff.7 4 On the other side is the powerful concern that is
at the core of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction: maximizing the ability
of federal courts to deal with matters that are properly before them and
preserving the attractiveness of the federal forum for federal claimants.
Drawing a line between pendent claims and pendent parties may be arbi-
trary.7 15 Indeed, the Court's hostility toward the latter form of jurisdiction
66. WoRiNo PZAuRs, supra note 34, Volume 1, at 516-31. This analysis includes a
recommendation for broadening removal to include federal counterclaims. The Subcommittee
recognizes that this would increase the federal courts' caseload, but finds this concern
outweighed by "the general interest in preserving a federal forum for federal claims." Id. at
531.
67. REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
68. Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (1989).
69. 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (1989).
70. REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
71. WoaxRio PAPERS, supra note 34, Volume 1, at 547.
72. REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
75. The Court in Finley seems to recognize this when it describes the cases on the need
for statutory authority as "not display[ing] an entirely consistent approach." Finley v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2010 (1989).
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may cast doubt on the validity of the former. 76 In any event, the Committee
considered the issue and, over the dissents of three members, took a firm
stand.
This action raises a basic question: why here and not elsewhere? Is it
conceivable that the Committee surveyed the entire range of Supreme Court
decisions on federal jurisdiction and related matters and found only one
area-pendent parties-where Congress should step in to overturn the result?
Even if this were somehow the case there is a closely related area that may
call for the same treatment: pendent state law claims against state officials
who are defendants in federal court suits based on federal law. Under
current eleventh amendment doctrine such suits are permissible as long as
the plaintiff seeks prospective relief rather than monetary compensation
from the state treasury based on past conduct. 77 In Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman,71 however, the Court ruled that the eleventh
amendment overrode generally applicable principles of pendent claim juris-
diction and barred state law claims against the same defendants. The decision
presents a would-be plaintiff with the same set of choices that the Committee
found undesirable in the pendent party context: bifurcating claims, foregoing
a claim, or bringing the entire suit in state court.7 9 Congress probably has
power to overrule Pennhurst.0 The Committee might well have addressed
the issue, given its view that "supplemental forms of jurisdiction, which
may be exercised in the discretion of the federal courts, enable them to
take full advantage of the rules on claim and party joinder to deal econom-
ically-in single rather than multiple litigation-with matters arising from
the same transaction or occurrence.""'
It is of course true that a case like Pennhurst presents questions of
federal jurisdiction in a sharply ideological context. At issue is whether a
federal forum is necessary to protect federal rights against state governments
and their officials. The result of the Court's federalism decisions is to send
a large number of these cases into the court system of the very state whose
conduct (or that of officials who act under color of its law) is under
scrutiny. The Court has been sharply divided over how to approach these
cases. Two ideological views compete for primacy. Federalist premises
emphasize respect for states as sovereign entities and the role of their courts
as enforcers of federal law.12 Nationalist premises focus on the post-Civil
War amendments' transformation of federalism, which took the form of
national rights against states and reliance on national institutions, especially
the federal courts, to protect those rights.83 Perhaps the Committee produced
76. WoRKING PA ERs, supra note 34, Volume 1, at 555-56.
77. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
78. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
79. See Brown, supra note 27, at 351-53.
80. See id. at 379-82, 394-401.
81. REPoRT, supra note 1, at 47.
82. See Fallon, supra note 12, at 1151-57.
83. See id. at 1158-64.
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a document dealing with nonideological judicial reform because it simply
wanted to stay out of this whole debate.
When one is dealing with federal court questions, however, ideology
has a way of turning up. It is difficult to prescribe federal jurisdiction
without a developed notion of the proper role of the federal courts. And
it is difficult to develop this notion without addressing basic value questions
such as the allocation of power among governmental entities in a federal
system. What is surprising about the Report, given what it does not address,
is the extent to which it engages in the process just described.
The Report states that its goal is "a principled allocation of jurisdic-
tion," 84 and that the Committee's "overriding concern ... is promoting
the most rational possible allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal
courts." 5 What drives this search is a belief that the "central task" of the
federal courts is "protecting federal rights and interests. '8 6 Protecting them
against the states certainly is part of this task as shown by the previously
quoted passage that "federal judicial intervention" is clearly necessary in
situations that "involve the protection of individual liberty against actions
of the political branches of government."
8 s7
Much of this sounds ideological, and every bit as nationalistic as a
ringing dissent by Justice Brennan. He would wholeheartedly endorse the
Committee's statement that "the primary responsibility of the federal courts
for resolving questions concerning federal rights [should not] be curtailed,
notwithstanding the availability of state courts." 88 The Report fails, however,
to consider where these premises might lead. Should federal jurisdiction
over federal cases be exclusive, for example? The Report comes close to
suggesting this as an ideal,8 9 although aniy attempt to realize it would run
up against pervasive notions of concurrent jurisdiction and the manifold
problems of mixed federal and state law cases. Moreover, as long as we
have concurrent jurisdiction, to say that a case somehow belongs in federal
court only begins to answer the hard questions that arise when it also
belongs in state court. Younger abstention cases, for example, are difficult
because each system has highly plausible arguments for being the one to
hear the dispute. The Court's ideological choices raise many questions; the
Report avoids them.
III. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A NONiDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO JUDICIAL
REFORM
This comment's focus on what is not in the Report is not meant to
obscure the breadth and significance of what it does contain in its analysis
84. REPORT, supra note 1, at 35 (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id. at 15.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 7.
89. See id. at 14. ("The general (not unvarying) principle of division should be that
state courts resolve disputes over state law, and federal courts resolve disputes over federal
law.")
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and more than one hundred recommendations. Besides eliminating almost
all of the diversity jurisdiction and shifting most drug cases to state courts
they include the following: the repeal of mandatory minimum sentence
provisions and a review of the Sentencing Guidelines; 9° a new article I Court
of Disability Claims for disability claims under the Social Security Act;9' a
broadened requirement of exhaustion of state remedies in prisoner civil
rights suits; 92 broadened statutory authorization for alternative dispute res-
olution procedures in civil litigation;93 and an experimental proposal to deal
with intercircuit conflicts by having the Supreme Court direct cases to a
circuit court that has not yet ruled on the issue for an en banc resolution
which will settle the issue. 94 These and other proposals reflect a lot of
thought and effort, and make an important contribution to any discussion
of how to change the federal court system. The nagging question that
remains, however, is why the Committee stopped where it did. Why, having
gone so deeply into questions of federal jurisdiction, did the Committee
shy away from the ideological dimensions of the subject and from the
Supreme Court's decisions and doctrines that reflect them?
A dispositive answer would be that the Committee was not authorized
to get into such matters. Examination of the statutory mandate shows,
however, that it was quite broad. The Committee's purposes include ex-
amining "problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United
States," 9 and developing a long range plan for the federal judiciary,
including assessment of "the types of disputes resolved by the Federal
Courts." 96 It is true that the Committee was directed to report to a number
of entities, including Congress, but not including the Court.97 The Committee
might have concluded that an extensive discussion of the pros and cons of
twenty years of Supreme Court decisions was beyond its sphere. Congress,
however, has extensive power to overturn these decisions and probably
ought to be informed of them as part of any examination of "problems
and issues currently facing the courts of the United States." Moreover, in
the area of pendent jurisdiction the Committee did examine what the Court
has done and recommended overruling it.
A more pragmatic explanation is that the Committee would have felt
politically awkward about engaging in a review of Supreme Court cases.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court appointed its members, and several
90. Id. at 133.
91. Id. at 55-59.
92. Id. at 48-51.
93. Id. at 82-86.
94. Id. at 125-29.
95. Id. at 189, citing Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988).
96. REPORT, supra note 1, at 189.
97. Id. The Report is, however, to be transmitted to the Chief Justice of the United
States. The summary table of recommendations includes a category of "Recommendations to
the Courts." Id. at 172-83.
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of them, including the Chairman, are lower federal court judges. It is
unrealistic to expect such a body to seem to sit in judgment of the High
Court. The Committee showed little reluctance, however, about questioning
the work of the United States Sentencing Commission,98 an important
governmental body (including federal judges) that Justice Scalia has called
a "junior varsity Congress." 99 And, again, the pendent party materials show
that the Committee was willing to evaluate the work of the Supreme Court
itself.
It seems implausible that the pendent party cases are the only ones
about which one can disagree. Perhaps the Committee limited itself to
pendent parties because that is one of the few areas where it could evaluate
the Court's doctrine without becoming involved in an ideological dispute.
A case such as Finley v. United States'00 can be seen as not resting on
controversial views of federalism and separation of powers. To call for its
overruling is to engage in nonideological judicial reform, while to call for
overruling Younger v. Harris '° would be to plunge into an ideological
battle. Assuming that this view of pendent parties is correct-a matter not
free from doubt' 02-the Committee may be sending an implicit message that
it is time to move beyond the ideological conflicts over federal jurisdiction
that dominated the 1970s and 1980s. The Report might be seen as an effort
to develop what Professor Fallon has called "mediating conclusions and
doctrines"103 that avoid the extremes of both federalist and nationalist
rhetoric while recognizing the values in each approach. If this is so, the
Report indeed is an important step forward, but one would expect an
explicit discussion of the issue. Even if one takes this approach, moreover,
it will not make the decisions of the Burger-Rehnquist Court go away. They
stand, until an authoritative body-Congress or the Court-changes them.
Perhaps this is acceptable to the Committee, but one would expect some
discussion of how to reconcile this result with the Report's emphasis on
protecting federal rights in federal court.
There is another possible explanation for the Committee's nontreatment
of ideological issues, one which will make federal courts teachers uncom-
fortable. The Committee may have felt that the issues that dominate the
federal courts classroom are largely irrelevant to a study of problems in the
federal courtroom. In other words, we have a classic example of the division
98. See id. at 135-40.
99. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 683 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
101. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
102. The Court has been sharply divided over the seemingly technical issue of pendent
parties. The dissenters have accused the majority of imparting "a fundamental bias against
utilization of the federal forum owing to the deterrent effect imposed by the needless
requirement of duplicate litigation if the federal forum is chosen." Finley v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 2003, 2021 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
1, 36 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Fallon, supra note 12, at 1231.
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between academia and the bar, in which those who practice "in the real
world" view academics' concerns as far removed from it. Perhaps the
Committee's choice of approach reflects the view of practitioners that, for
example, the availability of alternative dispute resolution is of far greater
importance to them and their clients than an incisive analysis of the eleventh
amendment's bearing on pendent jurisdiction.
In this respect it is worth noting that Judge Richard Posner is a member
of the Committee and Chairman of its Subcommittee on The Federal Courts
and Their Relation to the States. Posner's 1985 book, "The Federal Courts-
Crisis and Reform,"' 1 4 had a clear impact on the work of the entire
Committee.'05 Posner's book cast substantial doubt on the utility of doctrinal
analysis to the task of evaluating current problems in the federal courts.'01
This he saw as an institutional issue, and "the training and experience of
doctrinal analysts limit the contribution they can make to the solution of
what are, after all, largely economic, political, and managerial problems."' 1 7
In my view the Supreme Court's federal jurisdiction cases are important
both as a matter of doctrine and because of their impact on the federal
courts. Consider the eleventh amendment. Academics cannot seem to get
enough of it,"°s while Judge Posner in his book dismisses it with a wave of
the hand.'09 The amendment, as currently interpreted by the Court, is a.
major obstacle to people with grievances against state governments. The
fact that the Court deals so frequently with eleventh amendment issues"0
suggests that many of these people want to bring their grievances to a
federal court. Although it is virtually impossible to quantify how many
cases are not brought in federal court, common sense suggests that other
federal courts doctrines lead to this result. Without Younger abstention, for
example, a wide range of current state defendants could well be federal
plaintiffs.
When Judge Posner's book came out, Professor Redish criticized it on
grounds similar to those which I have advanced in criticizing the Committee
Report. According to Redish, Posner "failfed] to consider in detail the
validity of numerous Supreme Court decisions which have the effect of
reducing dockets.""' Redish felt that an analysis of the doctrinal decisions
would expose their inadequacies and lead to more federal court jurisdic-
104. R. POSNER, THE FEDERA CouRTs-CRsIs AND REFORM (1985).
105. E.g., REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7 (discussing why simply adding judges will not
resolve caseload crisis).
106. R. POSNER, supra note 104, at 322-35.
107. Id. at 325.
108. BroWn, Has the Supreme Court Confessed Error on the Eleventh Amendment?
Revisionist Scholarship and State Immunity, 68 N.C. L. REv. 867, n.7 (1990) (citing articles).
109. R. PosNR, supra note 104, at 189.
110. During the 1988 term the Court decided four eleventh amendment cases, and used
eleventh amendment analysis in deciding a fifth.
111. Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the Importance of Analyzing
Legal Doctrine, 85 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1378, 1384 (1985).
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tion. 1" 2 Supporters of the decisions will disagree, but neither side of this
argument supports omitting them from a comprehensive study of the federal
courts.
Redish's observations about the book may, however, provide a clue as
to why the Report is silent on doctrinal issues. Perhaps the Committee felt
that it is not yet time to reach them. Consideration of doctrinal issues was
not so much rejected as postponed until a later date when attention can be
focused on issues that might add to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The fundamental premise of the Report is that the federal courts face a
caseload crisis.' Thus the focus of virtually all of the Report's jurisdictional
recommendations is on getting cases out of those courts. Alleviating the
caseload crisis, then, is not the Committee's only goal, but an essential first
step toward that "most rational allocation of jurisdiction between state and
federal courts""14 that it seeks.
The Report points in this direction in its initial treatment of the
curtailment of diversity jurisdiction. Getting rid of diversity will, it is
contended, "free up the time of the federal courts to concentrate on their
central task, that of protecting federal rights and interests. It will make it
possible to consider ways of making the federal courts more effective
protectors of federal rights.""' 5 The Report lists the Anti-Injunction Act,
removal, and abstention as possible areas for such future consideration,1
6
as well as pendent party jurisdiction on which it does make a current
recommendation." 7 Of course, the undertaking need not be limited to these
subjects. Even the same Committee, given its view of the "central task" of
federal courts, would feel pulled towards considering all doctrines which
keep federal right holders out of federal courts.
One puzzling aspect of this scenario is why the Committee ties consid-
eration of expansion of federal rights cases so closely to the curtailment of
diversity jurisdiction. This can be done, the reader is told, "in a post-
diversity era in which federal courts are not preoccupied with the enforce-
ment of rights under state law.""" Why not do it now? Diversity jurisdiction
may never be changed. If the federal rights cases are, indeed, a higher
priority for federal court jurisdiction, those who want to bring them should
not have to wait until some elusive day that might not come. The caseload
problem can be reduced by other measures that the Committee recommends,
even if diversity remains untouched." 9 Also, it is not clear why diversity
cases so "preoccupy" federal judges with state law issues that they cannot
112. Id. at 1392.
113. REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-9; see also infra notes 120-30 and accompanying text
(examining premise that federal court system faces a caseload crisis).
114. REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.




119. Id. at 27-28.
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"concentrate" on federal issues. The point probably is one of volume rather
than intellectual energy. Whatever is wrong with the federal courts, federal
rightholders might prefer to join the queue and take their chances. What
is keeping many of them out is not diversity but a set of restrictive judge-
made doctrines. Perhaps it makes sense to defer consideration of them until
the caseload problem is dealt with, but the Report is hardly convincing on
this point. Indeed, one cannot say with any certainty why the ideological
jurisdictional issues are absent from the Report. The answers may lie in the
justifications I have suggested here; they may be elsewhere.
IV. TAE REPORT'S MAJOR PROPOSALS AFFECTING FEDERAL COURT
CASELOAD AND TBiRm MAoR PRMIsE.
This comment's focus on what is not in the Report is not meant to
downplay the importance of what it does contain. The Committee puts
forward a large number of thoughtful proposals aimed at improving the
operation of the federal judicial system as a means of resolving disputes
and reducing the caseload of the federal courts. The major specific proposals
are aimed at alleviating crowded federal dockets; indeed, caseload concerns
are the driving force behind much of the Report's call for reform. Thus
one's general approach to what the Report does discuss is likely to be
heavily influenced by one's perception of whether there is a caseload crisis
in the federal courts.
Given the centrality of this premise to the whole undertaking, the
Report is a bit ambivalent. It refers to the "current crisis"120 to the
"impending crisis"' 2' and to the crisis that is "at last upon us."'' A fair
reading would seem to be that the system is very close to its limits and that
unless significant action is taken it will no longer be able to process cases
in an acceptable manner. This is particularly true at the appellate level
where simply adding more judges can harm the goals of consistency and
collegiality. 123
Trying to establish that there is a caseload crisis in the federal courts
is not an easy task. Part of the problem is that, according to one observer,
"[n]o comprehensive study exists which considers all of the necessary
variables to adequately measure and evaluate the workload of the federal
courts."' 4 Another part of the problem is that the claim has been made
before. It is, for example, the major premise of Judge Posner's book.
Writing in 1985 he argued that the statistics of great caseload growth
demonstrated the existence of a crisis,'2 although his language was at times
120. Id. at 3.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id. at 6.
123. Id. at 7.
124. Levit, supra note 9, at 324.
125. The subtitle of the book is "Crisis and Reform." Part II, which contains the greatest
use of statistical information is titled "The Crisis." R. POSNER, supra note 104, at 59.
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also ambivalent. 126 Reviewers of the book differed over whether Posner had
proved his point.127 Posner was by no means the first federal judge to cry
wolf about the caseload problem.2'
To some extent the Committee's arguments for the existence of a crisis
today weaken Posner's claim of five years earlier. The Report identifies two
of the major causes of the crisis as the dramatic increase in federal drug
prosecution, 29 and the impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 30
Neither of these factors was present in 1985. If they are the key to the
current crisis that could mean that there was not a crisis in 1985. On the
other hand, they may have made a bad situation worse.
Apart from discussing these two recent developments the Report does
not offer much new on the crisis issue. The statistics show that there are a
lot of cases, but the existence of a crisis has to be taken somewhat on faith.
Perhaps it is enough that there is a serious problem; still, support for many
of the Report's proposals will depend substantially on the degree of accep-
tance of the premise of a caseload crisis.
A good example is the set of recommendations concerning diversity
jurisdiction. The Committee proposes as follows: "Congress should limit
federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship to complex multi-state
litigation, interpleader, and suits involving aliens. At the least, it should
effect changes to curtail the most obvious problems of the current jurisdic-
tion."'' The fall-back changes include raising the jurisdictional amount to
$75,000, prohibiting calculation of noneconomic harm and attorneys fees
in that amount, prohibiting plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction
in their home states, and deeming corporations to be citizens of every state
in which they are licensed to do business. 32 Either way the change would
take a lot of cases out of federal court.
The proposal has substantial merit. Most diversity cases probably do
not belong in federal court. The notion that state courts cannot be trusted
to handle state law claims against noncitizens seems out of date."' On the
other hand, Judge Posner himself has demonstrated that economic analysis
may support some diversity jurisdiction. 3 4 Perhaps the federal courts are
better equipped to handle complex matters involving interpleader and class
126. Compare id. at vii (system "on the verge of being radically changed for the worse"
under pressure of caseload growth) with id. at 261 (adoption of his proposals would go "some
way toward solving the federal courts' caseload crisis.").
127. Compare Estreicher, Book Review, 84 MicH. L. REv. 569, 572 (1986) (Posner's
portrait of crisis "overdrawn, and, in some places, entirely speculative") with Monaghan,
Book Review, 99 HIAv. L. REv. 344, 345-47 (1985) (expressing general agreement with Posner
on crisis).
128. Clark, Book Review, 1985 Wise. L. REv. 1183, 1185 n.13 (1985).
129. REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
130. Id. at 135-39.
131. Id. at 38.
132. Id. at 42.
133. Id. at 40.
134. R. POSNER, supra note 104, at 176.
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actions. Moreover, trying to curtail diversity involves a major political
fight. 13 Whether this is due to the merits of the jurisdiction or to the fact
that "the bar likes forum shopping"' 3 6 is hard to determine. The point is
that paying anything more than lip service to the Committee on this point
involves investment of substantial political resources.
Another politically difficult recommendation comes in the area of the
so-called war against drugs. "Federal prosecuting authorities should limit
federal prosecutions to charges that cannot or should not be prosecuted in
state courts and should forge federal-state partnerships to coordinate pros-
ecution efforts. Congress should direct additional funds to the states to help
them to assume their proper share of the responsibilities for the war on
drugs, including drug crime adjudication."'' 37 While curtailing diversity
jurisdiction is an old chestnut, this is a new issue. The Report shows that
criminal filings have increased substantially-over fifty percent since 1980-
and that they are growing faster than civil filings. 138 This is an important
development. Writing in 1985 Judge Posner had treated the statistics as
showing that civil cases were the main area of growth. 139 The Committee
argues persuasively that drug cases are the key to this side of the problem.
"Drug cases now account for 44 percent of the federal criminal trials, and
almost all of these are jury trials. Roughly 50 percent of federal criminal
appeals are drug cases."'' 4 Because of the requirements that the Speedy
Trial Act imposes on federal criminal cases, the Committee foresees a real
danger that the civil side of the docket will grind to a halt. 14 The question
of which judicial system should assume primary responsibility for adjudi-
cation of drug cases also implicates the broader federalism issue of where
responsibility for law enforcement properly lies.
These are important observations about an emerging issue. Precisely
because the Committee has no stake in any particular side of the drug issue,
its warnings about the impact on the federal courts are likely to get the
serious hearing they deserve. Yet as the following excerpt from two dis-
senting Committee members' statement shows, there are powerful policy
and political arguments that cut the other way: "our society is looking to
its law enforcement agencies to be vigorous in bringing to justice those who
are violating our drug laws, because the future of our nation is at stake....
The role of the federal courts is crucial to drug law enforcement, for without
their authority federal law enforcement loses its nationwide subpoena power,
its electronic surveillance authority, its contempt and immunity powers, and
its forfeiture authority to name a few.' ' 42 The dissenters argued for more
135. See generally Kastenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A
Legislative Perspective, 16 H~Aiv. J. LEG. 301 (1979).
136. Id. at 313.
137. REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
138. Id. at 36.
139. R. PosnER, supra note 104, at 64.
140. REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 38.
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federal judges. Perhaps we are dealing with a problem whose radically new
dimensions will sort themselves out over time. In any event, few enough
politicians will want to appear soft on drugs in the name of alleviating the
federal caseload problem. That makes all the more important a convincing
demonstration that the caseload problem exists.
The third major recommendation to deal with the caseload crisis is
imposition of a broadened requirement of exhaustion of state administrative
remedies on state prisoners who file civil rights suits.143 Currently a federal
statute spells out when state administrative schemes are sufficiently com-
prehensive that prisoners must exhaust them.'" The Committee views this
approach as too rigid,' 4" and also criticizes the Justice Department's admin-
istration of the current exhaustion requirement. 1' Giving states greater
latitude while preserving federal oversight through court review (or approval
by the Attorney General) probably makes sense, unless one is a strong
advocate of the standards in the existing statute. 147 On the surface the
number of cases affected is high. State prisoner filings constituted eleven
percent of all civil filings in 1989.'4 It is likely, however, that most of these
receive generally summary treatment. Even so, the recommendation would
have some impact, but one wonders why the Committee limited itself to
civil rights suits by prisoners. Many federal suits under section 1983 of title
42 might be foreclosed if the plaintiff were required to exhaust available
state administrative remedies. 49 Indeed, the major Supreme Court case
dealing with the exhaustion issue was based largely on analysis of the
prisoner statute that the Committee seeks to amend. 50 There is a major
federalism matter lurking here. Again a desire to avoid ideological issues
seems to be at work. Perhaps the Committee did not want the caseload
reduction push to be viewed as an anti-civil rights movement.
The Committee put forth a number of proposals of somewhat lesser
significance that would reduce the number of cases filed in the district
courts or the courts of appeals, or both. These include the following:
restructuring tax litigation by mandating that virtually all cases be brought
in the Tax Court and appeals taken to a new article III Appellate Division
of that Court;' restructuring social security disability claim litigation by
creating a new article I Court of Disability Claims; 52 implementing a
143. Id. at 48-49.
144. Id. at 48, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1988).




149. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (rejecting generalized exhaustion
requirement).
150. Patsy was not a prisoner case. However, the Court declined to impose a generalized
requirement of exhaustion in section 1983 cases largely because Congress had imposed such a
requirement in the prisoner context. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 510.
151. REPoRT, supra note 1, at 69.
152. Id. at 55.
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program of voluntary arbitration by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission of employment discrimination cases; 153 repealing the Federal
Employers Liability Act and shifting the cases into state workers compen-
sation systems; 154 requiring greater use of non-article III judge in bankruptcy
appeals; 155 and creating a federal claims procedure.
5 6
These proposals raise a number of interesting issues, particularly the
interrelated questions of the use of article I versus article III courts 5 7 and
the value of specialized versus generalized adjudication. 58 In conjunction
with the major proposals discussed above they would bring about substantial
change in the workload of the federal courts, both in terms of type and
number of cases. The proposals rest to some degree on notions of what
cases ought to be in federal court, but they do not raise the difficult
ideological questions of recent Supreme Court decisions. The Committee
estimates that adoption of its proposals would reduce the courts of appeals
caseload by 16.6 percent and that of the district courts by 37.2 percent.'5 9
These figures appear not to include any reduction in drug cases. Perhaps
the Report is indeed, as speculated above,'60 only a first step toward
developing greater federal court capacity for cases that are now not brought
there.'
6'
V. OPERATIONAL PRoPosALs AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER STUDY.
There are a number of recommendations in the Report that are aimed
not so much at reducing the federal courts' caseload as at affecting how
individual cases are dealt with in those courts.' 62 These recommendations
are dealt with here only briefly because they do not, generally, raise
ideological questions about the role of federal courts and they do not,
generally, require a response to recent Supreme Court decisions.
The most controversial of these proposals involves an apparent disa-
greement between the Committee and the United States Sentencing Com-
mission. The Commission has promulgated Guidelines which are the major
determinant of sentences in federal criminal cases. Views about the Guide-
153. Id. at 60-61.
154. Id. at 62.
155. Id. at 74-75.
156. Id. at 81.
157. See generally Brown, Article III as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of Northern
Pipeline and its Implications for Congressional Power, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 55 (1988).
158. REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
159. Id. at 27-28.
160. See supra text accompanying note 10.
161. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 44 ("Eliminating or substantially curtailing diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction would provide added capacity to let federal courts resolve additional
disputes when the unique characteristics of the federal courts are pertinent.").
162. The line between proposals intended to reduce the federal courts' caseload and those
directed at reform of the handling of individual cases is not absolute. A proposal for greater
use of magistrates, see id. at 79-81, both alters the handling of cases and reduces the demands
on article III judges' time.
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lines differ, to put it mildly. The committee sided with the critics, finding
"a pervasive concern that the Commission's guidelines are producing fun-
damental and deleterious changes in the way federal courts process criminal
cases and federal judges use their time."' 63 Three members went further
and stated that "guideline sentencing is contributing significantly to a
criminal caseload crisis which threatens to paralyze the district courts."'
64
The Committee, however, stepped back from its draft recommendation of
amendment of the Federal Sentencing Act. 165 The final recommendation is
that, because of the serious criticisms that have been made, Congress and
others "give serious and close attention to the sentencing guidelines prom-
ulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission, with a view to a
careful and in-depth re-evaluation by Congress of federal sentencing policy
and, in particular, the sentencing guidelines."'166
The problems cited include the inflexibility of the Guidelines' 67 and the
large amount of judges' time required to comply with them. 6 The Com-
mittee was particularly concerned with their impact on plea bargaining. The
Committee cites disagreement over whether they permit it.169 Calling for
statutory amendment seems premature. Any problem might well be cured
at the administrative level, for example. The Report does not examine
alternatives to statutory amendment. Perhaps this is an area where study
makes sense.
Most of the Committee's focus in the operational area is on civil
litigation. The general approach that emerges is encouragement of nontra-
ditional approaches, at least as supplements or alternatives. For example,
the Report is strongly supportive of "case management" by federal district
judges. 70 This technique involves "the early involvement and active role [of
judges] in the management of litigation."' 71 The Committee endorses "meas-
ures such as status conferences; targets for completion of various pretrial
stages; and close supervision of discovery, including prompt decisions on
discovery issues by one judicial officer primarily responsible for discovery
matters in the case.' 72 The view seems to be that this is not only a way
to keep up the momentum in complex cases, but also an appropriate use
of judicial resources in general.
The Committee is also positive about a greater utilization of nonjudicial
resources in deciding cases. It supports the general approach known as
alternative dispute resolution, and recommends that Congress "broaden
163. Id. at 135.
164. Id. at 141.
165. Id. at 140-42.
166. Id. at 135.
167. Id. at 137.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 137-38.
170. Id. at 99-100.
171. Id. at 99.
172. Id. at 100.
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statutory authorization for local rules for alternative and supplementary
procedures in civil litigation, including rules for cost and fee incentives." 1 7
The Committee also takes a favorable stance on the use of magistrates in
civil cases within the courts, 74 although it does not want them to achieve
the status of "an autonomous class of judicial officers."
1 7
1
One possible critique of the Committee's treatment of operational issues
is that it took too much refuge in calls for further study. For example, on
the controversial issue of sanctions under Federal Rule 11,176 the Report
cited the disagreement over the matter as a reason for not taking a stand.'"7
Frequently the Committee recommended study when it felt that it lacked
the resources or the time to do the job. 78 I do not feel that this tendency
weakens the Report substantially. Even these portions of the Report serve
to flag important issues. And on a wide range of important, controverted
operational issues the Committee's stance is clear.
VI. CoNcLusIoN-GuNs AND BU=rER?
Looked at in perspective the Report is an impressive document, espe-
cially considering its relative brevity at less than two hundred pages. The
Committee deals with what I have called operational issues in an informative
way. Its proposals to reduce the federal courts' caseload could have a
substantial impact. Yet the high quality of the analysis which is there makes
one wish that the Committee had turned its considerable abilities to ideo-
logical issues concerning the federal courts, as well as the nonideological
ones. Why not, as an economist might say, produce guns and butter?
Whether the reason is one of those suggested above or some other, the
Committee did not do this. Ignoring these issues will not make them go
away. The Court's decisions stand; and it continues to hand down new
ones. 79 At the moment the only dialogue is between the Court and the law
review writers. Perhaps Congress will step in, but this is likely to happen
in the context of a specific issue, such as habeas corpus, rather than as
part of an overall look at the federal courts. Thus, I view the Report, for
all of its positive features, as an opportunity missed. Injecting a good deal
more federal courts law into the Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee would have strengthened the document and made the entire
exercise more meaningful.
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179. In the 1988 term, for example, the Court handed down a significant Younger
decision, New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct.
2506 (1989) and a number of eleventh amendment decisions, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). The issue of habeas corpus continues to generate important cases,
e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
